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8:12–20 and Philo, Legum Allegoria 3.205–208:  
Some Observations 
 
By Per Jarle Bekken, Oslo 
 
 
 
Thesis  
 
Philo of Alexandria is a representative of Diaspora Judaism and of Judaism as such in the late 
Second Temple period. His writings have also been used to illuminate the background and the 
wider context of the New Testament and the Early Church. Thus, e.g., many studies have 
investigated the way Philonic material might illuminate various aspects of the Gospel of 
John.1 It is the aim of this essay to shed new light on the controversy on self–witness reflected 
in John 5:31–40 and 8:12–20 against the background of Jewish forensic data to be found in 
the discourse selected from Philo’s treatise Legum Allegoria, book 3, §§ 205–208.2  We shall 
attempt to argue that Philo of Alexandria provides a Jewish referential background for the 
controversy on self–witness reflected in Jn 5:31–40 and 8:12–20.3 Thus, the data in Leg. All. 
3.205-208, overlooked among the interpreters of John, delivers documentation for the view 
that the controversy on self-witness in Jn 5:31-40 and 8:12-20 is a specifically ‘Christian’ 
version of a discussion which most probably also has existed among Jews in Alexandria. The 
study will evidence that aspects of the debate reported by John on this forensic topic can be 
located within a Jewish context exemplified by Philo. Specifically, the view represented by 
Philo, viz. that only God was capable of giving a self–authenticating testimony, supplies a 
Jewish context for the point made by the Evangelist that Jesus could testify to himself because 
of his divine origin. By unfolding and supporting such a hypothesis by means of a comparison 
of Philo and John we hope to suggest fresh answers to some of the questions raised among 
scholars concerning the Johannine texts.  
 
The course of this study will be: First, an outline of the relevant texts in Philo and John will 
be given. Then, the state of research shall be sketched. Finally, by the way of a comparison of 
Philo and John our hypothesis will be argued. The study will be rounded off by a conclusion.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 See P. Borgen, Early Christianity and Hellenistic Judaism (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996) 105, for references. 
2
 In this essay the Gospel of John=John. The author may also be referred to as ‘the Evangelist’. In references the 
abbreviation Jn is used. The Biblical texts are quoted according to RSV. The Philonic texts are rendered 
according to LCL. 
3
 By “referential background” we mean the general setup of institutions, conventions, philosophies, ideas, etc., 
which, without necessarily being explicitly referred to in a text, nonetheless form a background of that to which 
the text refers, and this in such a way that one should know about this background in order to catch the full 
implication of the text. We can imagine cases in which such features and implications of a text are fully shared 
by the author and the reader, in such a way that the sender’s and receiver’s horizons coincide. Here we will 
assume the view that a receiver has a correct understanding of a text, when the sender and receiver fully share 
features of the background to which the message of the text refers. Cf. P. J. Bekken, The Word is near You: A 
Study of  Deuteronomy 30:12–14 in Paul’s Letter to the Romans in a Jewish Context (BZNW 144; Berlin/New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming). 
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An outline of Leg. All. 3.205–208 within its literary context 
 
Leg. All. 3.205-208 is located within the literary context of one of the two main groups of 
expository writings in the Philonic corpus, viz. the exegetical commentaries on Genesis.4 This 
series covers the main part of Genesis 2-41. In general they have the form of a running verse-
by-verse commentary on the biblical texts. In The Allegorical Laws, Book 3 (Legum 
Allegoriae 3) Philo comments on Genesis 3:8b-19. He uses the verses from Genesis as 
headings and starting points for expositions of other parts of the Pentateuch. Thus, the  
structure of the immediate literary context to Leg. All. 3.205-208, viz. Leg. All. 3.200-219, can 
be displayed in the following way: 
 
Leg. All. 3.200: Quotation of the main biblical text, Gen 3:16: “And to the woman He said, ‘I 
will greatly multiply thy sorrows and thy groaning’” 
(K a i; t h'/ g u n a ik i; ei\p e Pl hqu vn wn  p lhqu n w' t a;" lu vp a " so u  k a i; t o;n  st en a g m o vn  so u). 
  
Leg. All. 3.200-202: Direct paraphrasing exegesis of the word “grief” (lu vp h) from Gen 3:16 
as the lot of Sense-perception in contrast to gladness, exemplified by the way the slave and 
the athlete take a beating. 
 
Leg. All. 3.203-210: Whereas God has appointed pains on the woman-sense, he has bestowed 
on the noble soul an abundance of ‘blessings’. This topic is exemplified by a quotation of Gen 
22:16 followed by an exegetical paraphrase of the words “By Myself I have sworn” (203-208) 
and “for whose sake thou has done this thing” (209-210) from the quotation. References to 
other biblical texts such as Num 12:7 (204) and Deut 6:13 (208) are given. 
 
Leg. All. 3.211-219: Philo returns to the main text of Gen 3:16: Direct paraphrasing exegesis 
of the word “groaning” (st en a g m ov"). There are references to other biblical texts such as Exod 
2:23 (212; 214), Exod 20:24 (215), Gen 17:15f. (217-218), Gen 18:11 (218), and Gen 21:6 
(219). 
 
As regards the content of Leg. All. 3.205-208 it consists of Philo’s paraphrasing exegesis of 
the words “By Myself I have sworn” from Gen 22:16. In § 204 Philo refers to some 
interlocutors who object to the case of an oath taken by God: “Some have said, that it was 
inappropriate for Him to swear”. Then follows an immediate definition on an oath according 
to Philo:  
 
For an oath is added to assist faith, and only God and one who is God’s friend is 
faithful, even as Moses is said to have been found “faithful in all his house” (Num 
12:7). Moreover, the very words of God are oaths and laws of God and most sacred 
ordinances; and a proof of His sure strength is that whatever He saith cometh to pass, 
                                                          
4
 The exegetical commentaries on Genesis fall into two subordinate series: a) Questions and Answers on Genesis 
and on Exodus. B) The Allegorical Commentary on Genesis consists of Allegorical Laws 1-3; On the Cherubim; 
On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain; The Worse Attacks the Better; On the Posterity and Exile of Cain; On the 
Giants; On the Unchangeableness of God; On Husbandry; On Noah’s Work as Planter; On Drunkenness; On 
Sobriety; On the Confusion of Tongues; On the Migration of Abraham; Who is the Heir of Divine Things?; On 
Mating with the Preliminary Studies; On Flight and Finding; On the Change of Names; On God; On Dreams. 
The other main group of expository writings is The Exposition of the Laws of Moses, in which Philo to a great 
extent paraphrases and expands the biblical texts.  
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and this is specially characteristic of an oath. It would seem to be a corollary from this 
that all God’s words are oaths receiving confirmation by accomplishment in act. 
 
In §§ 205-208 Philo returns to the objection of the other interpreters and his own subsequent 
answer. Thus, this text consists of a dialogue, in which the problem raised by the interpreters 
is solved by Philo in the form of a “questions and answers”. The text can be structured and 
rendered in this way: 
 
The problem propounded by other interpreters:  
 
(205) They say indeed that an oath is a calling God to witness to a point which is 
disputed; so if it is God that swears, He bears witness to Himself, which is absurd, for 
he that bears the witness must needs be a different person from him on whose behalf it 
is borne.  
 
Question:  
 
What then must we say?  
 
Answer:  
 
First that there is nothing amiss in God bearing witness to Himself.   
For who else would be capable of bearing witness to Him?  
Secondly, He Himself is to Himself all that is most precious, kinsman, intimate, friend, 
virtue, happiness, blessedness, knowledge, understanding, beginning, end, whole, 
everything, judge, decision, counsel, law, process, sovereignty.  
(206) Besides if we once take “by Myself have I sworn” in the right way, we shall quit 
this excessive quibbling.  
 
Philo’s final answer to the objection and the solution of the problem: 
 
Probably then the truth of the matter is something like this. Nothing that can give 
assurance can give positive assurance touching God, for to none has He shown His 
nature, but He has rendered it invisible to our whole race. Who can assert of the First 
cause either that It is without body or that It is a body, that It is of such a kind or that It 
is of no kind? In a word who can make any positive assertion concerning His essence 
or quality or state or movement? Nay He alone shall affirm anything regarding 
Himself since He alone has unerringly exact knowledge of His own nature.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
(207) God alone therefore is the strongest security first for Himself, and in the next 
place for His deeds also, so that He naturally swore by Himself when giving assurance 
as to Himself, a thing impossible for another than He.  
 
Consequence:  
 
It follows that men who say that they swear by God should be considered actually 
impious; for naturally no one swears by Him, seeing that he is unable to possess 
knowledge regarding his nature. No, we may be content if we are able to swear by His 
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name (as we have seen) the interpreting word. For this must be God for us the 
imperfect folk, but as for the wise and perfect, the primal Being is their God.  
(208) Moses too, let us observe, filled with wonder at the transcendency of the 
Uncreate, says, “and thou shalt swear by His name” [Deut. vi. 13], not “by Him,” for it 
is enough for the created being that he should be accredited and have witness borne to 
him by the Divine word; but let God be His own most sure guarantee and evidence. 
 
 
With regard to its content it is clear that Philo here renders a discussion on the rule of self-
witness and the problem that arises when it is applied to God. Philo refers to some other 
interpreters who deny that anyone can give witness in his own case; accordingly, they hold it 
to be absurd too that God can bear witness to Himself. Philo refutes such an objection by 
arguing in various ways that it is only God who is capable of giving witness to himself. We 
will await a further analysis of both the “form” and the content of this Philonic text and its 
probable setting, until we reach to the point of comparison with the Johannine texts. Next we 
shall give a brief sketch of these two texts.  
 
 
An outline of Jn 5:31-40 and 8:12-20 within their literary contexts5 
 
Jn 5:31-40 
 
The context of Jn 5:31-40 is as follows:  According to Jn 5:1-18 the accusations against Jesus 
is twofold: 1. He has broken the laws of the Sabbath as it was not lawful to carry a pallet; 2. In 
his justification of the healing on the Sabbath, Jesus made the claim that he was doing the 
same works as God the Father. He made himself ‘equal to God’, and the ‘Jews’ sought to kill 
him (Jn 5:18).  
 
In the following section, Jn 5:19-30, the relationship between the Son and the God, the Father 
is characterized. A conclusion is reached in v.30: ‘I can do nothing on my own authority; as I 
hear, I judge; and my judgement is just, because I seek not my own will, but the will of him 
who sent me.’  
 
Upon what evidence do the claims of Jesus rest? In Jn 5:31-40 the Evangelist delivers the 
“Legitimation Jesu” in order to explain further the relation between God, the Father and the 
Son.6 Thus, the trial scene depicted in the remaining part of Jn 5 is characterized by a forensic 
debate between Jesus and his Jewish opponents, in which the Baptist, Jesus’ own works, God 
the sender, and the Scriptures serve as Jesus’ witnesses.7 
 
An outline of the text runs: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate  John’s use of oral or written gospel traditions in these texts. 
6
 Cf. H. Thyen, Das Johannesevangelium (HNT 6; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 319. 
7
 For a rhetorical analysis of Jn 5:31-47, see H. Attridge, “Argumentation in John 5,” in Rhetorical 
Argumentation in Biblical Texts: Essays from the Lund 2000 Conference (Edited by A. Eriksson, T. H. Olbricht, 
and W. Überlacker. Emory Studies in Early Christianity, vol. 8; Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 
2002) 188-199, esp. 196-199. 
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The claim of Jesus:  
 
If I alone bear witness to myself, my testimony is not true; there is another who bears 
witness to me, and I know that the testimony which he bears to me is true.  
 
 
First testimony:  
 
You sent to John, and he has borne witness to the truth. Not that the testimony which I 
receive is from man; but I say this that you may be saved. He was a burning and 
shining lamp, and you were willing to rejoice for a while in his light.  
 
 
Second testimony:  
 
But the testimony which I have is greater than that of John; for the works which the 
Father has granted me to accomplish, these very works which I am doing, bear me 
witness that the Father has sent me.  
 
Third testimony:  
 
And the Father who sent me has himself borne witness to me. His voice you have 
never heard, his form you have never seen; and you do not have his word abiding in 
you, for you do not believe him whom he has sent.  
 
Fourth testimony:  
 
You search the scriptures, because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it |
 is they that bear witness to me, yet you refuse to come to me that you may have life. 
 
 
John 8:12-20 
 
As regards the location of this text within its literary context, Jn 8 is among most scholars 
seen as a direct continuation from chapter 7, so that Jn 7:1-8:59 is seen as a unit. Thus, Jn 
8:12 is a saying on Jesus as the Light of the world comparable to Jn 7:37. This theme is here 
used to introduce the theme of testimonies to Jesus (Jn 8:13-20), which seems to be a further 
development of the discourse in Jn 5:31-40. In Jn 8:21-30 the questions are raised about 
whence Jesus comes and whither he goes, who is the Father and who is Jesus. The similar 
theme on his identity and his relation to his Father is further developed in Jn 8:31-59, 
however, in new terms.  
 
The affirmation that Jesus is the truth made known to men leads to the development of the 
theme in which Jesus and his adversaries are contrasted. The objections by the critics and 
Jesus’ answer can be listed as follows: 
 
The claim of Jesus:  
 
Again Jesus spoke to them, saying, “I am the light of the world; he who follows me 
will not walk in darkness, but will have the light of life.”  
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The objection of the Pharisees:  
 
The Pharisees then said to him, “You are bearing witness to yourself; your testimony 
is not true.”  
 
 
The reply of Jesus to the objection by a threefold argument: 
 
(First argument)  
 
Jesus answered, “Even if I do bear witness to myself, my testimony is true, for I know 
whence I have come and whither I am going, but you do not know whence I have 
come and whither I am going. 
 
(Second argument)  
 
You judge according to the flesh; I judge no one. Yet even if I do judge, my judgment 
is true, for it is not I alone who judge, but I and he who sent me.  
 
(Third argument)  
 
In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true; I bear witness to myself, 
and the Father who sent me bears witness to me.”  
 
Question:  
 
They said to him therefore, “Where is your Father?”  
 
Answer:  
 
Jesus answered, “You know neither me nor my Father; If you knew me, you would 
know my Father also.”  
 
Editorial note:  
 
These words he spoke in the treasury, as he taught in the temple; but no one arrested 
him, because his hour had not yet come.  
 
 
After having presented briefly the relevant texts, we turn to some of the main questions posed 
among scholars on the Johannine discourses as a foil for the formulation of the thesis of the 
study. 
 
 
The state of research 
 
Are there legal and forensic traditions in the Philonic corpus which may shed light upon the 
legal features of the passages Jn 5:31-40 and 8:12-20? A survey of the scholarly literature 
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concludes that the field is open for a study comparing Philo and John on this issue.8 J. Beutler, 
when discussing Jn 5:31 and 8:13-14, presents the commonly accepted view that John here 
reflects a judicial principle attested in Jewish, Greek as well as in Latin sources, viz. that a 
person cannot serve as his own witness.9 Although Beutler has discussed the Philonic material 
on witness, which he characterises as non-forensic, he does not however draw on this data in 
the course of his analysis of Jn 5:31-37 and 8:12-17.10 Concerning Jn 8:13-14, Beutler 
represents a commonly held view among scholars: “Die Ausnahme von der genannten 
Rechtsregel ist in dem besonderen Fall Jesu begründet”.11 In a review of Beutler’s book, P. 
Borgen commented on such a point of view:  
 
Thus, he [sic. Beutler] here overlooks that Philo, (who refers the view of others) in 
Leg. All., III, 205, states an exception to the rule against self-witness in a way which 
corresponds to that of John. According to Philo, only God is capable of giving witness 
to himself. John correspondingly states that Jesus can witness to himself because of 
His divine origin. Thus, John presupposes Jewish debate on the forensic rule against 
self-witness and the problem that arises when it is applied to God. The Evangelist did 
not himself create the exception to the rule when it was applied to Jesus, as Beutler 
claims.12 
 
Unfortunately, Borgen has not followed up this hypothesis in his later studies on John by an 
extensive analysis of this Philonic text in comparison with the two Johannine texts. Thus, the 
present study will be an effort to unfold the thesis Borgen hinted at by a detailed comparative 
analysis of the relevant texts.  
 
If we presuppose that the Philonic data provides a Jewish context for understanding the 
controversy reflected in Jn 5:31 and 8:13-14, we can ask more specifically: Are there 
particular aspects of these Johannine texts Philo may illuminate too? As a background for our 
attempt to answer this question it will be profitable to begin with some of the problems which 
scholars have discussed regarding the Johannine texts. 
 
a. Is there a contradiction between the statements in Jn 5:31 (“If I alone bear witness about 
myself, my testimony is not deemed true”) and Jn 8:14 (“Jesus answered: ‘Even if I do bear 
witness about myself, my testimony is true …’”)? According to Jn 5:31–32 Jesus is seen as a 
human being who is dependent on and in need of his Father’s testimony. On the other  hand, 
in Jn 8:14 Jesus’ own witness is viewed as self–authenticating. C. K. Barrett comments on Jn 
5:31:  
                                                          
8
 Among scholars who have examined the forensic aspect in John, T. Preiss (Life in Christ. [StBth 13; London: 
SCM. Translation of La Vie en Christ. Neuchâtel-Paris, 1951]), N. A. Dahl (“The Johannine Church and 
History,” in Current issues in New Testament Interpretation: FS O. A. Piper. [Edited by W. Klassen and G. F. 
Snyder. New York: Harper, 1962], 124-142), J. Blank (Krisis: Untersuchungen zur johanneischen Christologie 
und Eschatologie. [Freiburg: Lambertus Verlag, 1964]), S. Pancaro (The Law in the Fourth Gospel. [NovT 
Suppl 13; Leiden: Brill, 1975]), J. Beutler (Martyria: Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum 
Zeugnisthema bei Johannes. [Frankfurter Theologische Studien  10; Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Josef Knecht, 
1972]), and A. Lincoln (Truth on trial: The lawsuit motif in John’s Gospel. [Peabody, Ma.: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2000]) have made helpful contributions. However, neither of these scholars have drawn on Philo’s 
writings to illuminate the judicial connotations of Jn 5:31–40 and 8:12–20. 
9
 Cf. J. Beutler, Martyria, 256 n. 182, for references. 
10
 Ibid., 147–148. 
11
 Cf. Ibid., 268, for further references to scholars maintaining such a view.  
12
 Borgen, “Review of J. Beutler, Martyria: Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Zeugnisthema bei 
Johannes. Frankfurter Theologische Studien  10; Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1972,” Biblica 55 
(1974) 583. 
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In this verse there is a formal contradiction with 8.14 […] .  In each place the speech is 
ad hominem and the meaning is sufficiently plain; yet it may be questioned whether a 
writer who had fully revised his work would have left the two statements in their 
present form.13 
 
H. Thyen thinks that the contradiction is “nur scheinbar” and objects to Barrett’s 
understanding:  
 
Da muss man Johannes nicht der Flüchtigkeit verdächtigen und wie Barrett fragen, 
„ob ein Schriftsteller, der sein Werk vollständig durchgesehen hat, die zwei Aussagen 
in ihrer vorliegenden Form hätte stehen lassen“ (Komm. 279). Denn gerade in diesem 
gewiss nicht zufällig ,stehen gebliebenen’, sondern absichtsvoll gesetzten 
Wiederspruch besteht ja das Paradox der Sendung Jesu als des fleischgewordenen 
Logos.14 
 
Darum kann und muss der Sohn dem Satz, dass sein Zeugnis, wenn es denn ein 
Zeugnis in eigener Sache wäre, unglaubwürdig ist, in 8,14 den anderen Satz 
hinzufügen, dass aber sein Zeugnis gleichwohl glaubwürdig ist, weil es nämhlich gar 
nicht das Seine ist.15 
  
 
A. Lincoln states his understanding of Jn 5:31 and 8:14 as follows:  
 
On the one hand, in 5:31, 32, Jesus as a human being is totally dependent on his Father 
and in need of the Father’s validating testimony. On the other hand, here in 8:14, he is 
so at one with God that his witness is self–authenticating, for by definition God needs 
no one to validate God’s testimony.16 
 
As we shall observe in more detail below, Philo can provide a Jewish context which testifies 
to Lincoln’s reading of John 8:14 and which might explain Jesus’ exceptional identity of the 
one who is testifying about himself, viz. only God is capable of giving witness to himself, and 
therefore his witness is self–authenticating. 
 
b. J. Blank has raised another question concerning John 8:14:   
 
Die Begründung o {t i o i\da  p ovqen  h\lqo n  k a i; p o u' u jp a vg w ist freilich merkwürdig genug. 
Wie kan Jesu Wissen um seinen Ursprung und sein Ziel, also um seinen Weg, Grund 
sein für die Wahrheit des Selbstzeugnisses?17  
 
Blank suggests this answer:  
 
Jesu Wissen um seinen Woher und Wohin bezeichnet sein vollkommenes Um-sich 
selber-Wissen; Jesus weiss so um sich selbst, dass ihm sein Woher und Wohin bekannt 
                                                          
13
 C. K. Barrett, The Gospel according to St John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek 
Text (2. ed.; London: SPCK, 1978) 264. 
14
 Thyen, Das Johannesevangelium, 319. 
15
 Ibid., 320. 
16
 Lincoln, Truth on trial, 84-85. 
17
 Blank, Krisis, 217–218. 
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ist.  [… ] Somit ist deutlich: Jesu Wissen um sein Woher und Wohin ist nicht anderes, 
als das Wissen um seinen Ausgang vom und seine Rückkehr zum Vater; sein Wissen 
um den Vater überhaupt als Ursprung und Ziel seiner selbst.18   
 
As we shall observe, John’s way of reasoning about Jesus’ self–authenticating witness has an 
analogy in Philo. 
 
c. How are we to understand the various testimonies of John the Baptist, the Father, the 
works, and the Scriptures?  To what do they refer and do they have the same status as 
witnesses?  
 
According to Barrett there is a discussion in John on testimonies which are of primarily or 
secondary authority. Only the witness of God himself is a satisfactory testimony to Jesus. The 
others―the witness of the Baptist, the witness of the works done by Jesus in the Father’s 
name, and the witness of the Old Testament―these are all derived testimonies, of real but 
secondary authority.19 
 
According to Lincoln the various testimonies which are adduced to provide proof for Jesus 
‘do not constitute a straightforward list where each is distinct and has the same status as 
witness, as commentators frequently suggest’.20 Lincoln holds the view that  
 
Jesus works, which are given him by the Father, and the Scriptures, which are the 
Father’s word, can, then, both be seen as the visible aspects of the Father’s testimony. 
This testimony is contrasted to that of the Baptist.21 
 
Thyen, who shares a similar perspective, thinks, however, that John makes some sort of 
distinction between the witnesses of God to Jesus, viz. the “works” and the “Scriptures”, 
explicitly mentioned in Jn 5:36 and 5:39 and the Father’s witness referred to in Jn 5:37a..22 
This point of view, then, raises the question: Does the Evangelist by the reference to the 
Father’s direct witness in Jn 5:37a. think of a particular occasion or a particular kind of 
witness? Scholars have made several different suggestions. Most scholars take it to refer to 
the Father’s witness through the “works” of Jesus and the “Scriptures”.23 Other interpreters 
have seen here an allusion to the voice from heaven at the Baptism.24 Barrett has suggested 
that it refers to the testimony of God granted to those who first believe in Jesus.25 R. 
Schnackenburg has connected the idea about the testimony of the Father in Jn 5:37a. with the 
verb sfr a g ivz w in Jn 6:27b., which according to Lidell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon 
means to “to accredit as an envoy”, with an equivalent in the Hebrew and Aramaic word !yt, 
“to seal”, which is the technical term for sealing as a witness.26 Thus, the understanding of 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 218. 
19
 Barrett, The Gospel, 258. 
20
 Lincoln, Truth on trial, 77. 
21
 Ibid., 77. 
22
 Cf. Thyen, Das Johannesevangelium, 323. 
23
 So, e.g., Dahl, “The Johannine Church”, 109; Pancaro, The Law, 224; Thyen, Das Johannesevangelium, 323. 
24
 Cf. for example, R. Asting, Die verkündigung des Wortes im Urchristentum, dargestellt an den Begriffen 
„Wort gottes“, „Evangelium“ und „Zeugnis“  (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1939) 679; J. Schneider, Das 
Evangelium nach Johannes (Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament. Sonderbd.; Berlin: 
Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1976) 133.  
25
 Barrett, The  Gospel, 267. 
26
 Cf. H.G. Lidell and R. Scott, A Greek–English Lexicon: A New Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Reprint, 
1958), 1742; M. Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic 
Literature (Reprint Israel, no date)  513-514. 
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Schnackenburg suggests that the testimony of the Father in Jn 5:37a. points to the way God 
sealed the Son of Man and bore witness to Him as his envoy.27  
 
The questions about the meaning of the various testimonies and in particular the witness of 
the Father shall be dealt with more fully in the comparison of John and Philo.  
 
d. Is Jn 5:37b. to be treated as a parenthesis or is it to be put on the same footing as Jn 5:38a. 
as a reproach? The opinions of the scholars are divided on this point. If the words of v. 37b. 
are a parenthesis, they are not meant as a reproach but a statement of a fact and/or a 
recognized principle. Then the Evangelist rejects the notion that the “Jews” have ever heard 
the voice of God or seen his form. The principle is that there is no direct access to the Father: 
God is transcendent, and his form and voice are not immediately accessible and assessable. 
Fact and principle need not both be affirmed. Scholars such as Dahl, Borgen, and Pancaro 
hold the view that Jn 5:37b. is to be taken as a reproach and that it alludes to the revelation at 
Sinai.28 There the Israelites heard the voice of God, and – in spite of Deuteronomy 4:12 – 
according to some Jewish texts and traditions they also saw his “form”.29 Since Jn 6:46 
declares that there is no vision of God apart from the Son, then it is probable that God’s 
“form” appearing at Mount Sinai, is identified with the Son of God. Hence, in John’s 
interpretation the “Jews”, refusing to believe in Jesus, prove that they did not see God’s 
“form” and so have no share in the (anticipatory) revelation of the Son given to Israel at 
Mount Sinai.30  
 
In the light of the evidence in Philo we shall suggest a Jewish referential background for the 
interpretation of Jn 5:37b., which also seems to fit in well with the preceding v. 37a.. 
We turn to compare the texts of Philo and John with emphasis on some interesting points of 
similarities. 
 
 
A Jewish Controversy on Self-witness: a Comparison of John and Philo  
 
As we shall observe there are striking points of similarities between Jn 5:31–39; 8:12–20 and 
Leg. All. 3.205–208.  
 
1.  Controversy on the issue of self-witness 
 
Both John and Philo refer to a controversy about the validity on self–witness. In John the 
controversy takes place between Jesus and his interlocutors represented by the “Jews” (Jn 
5:31–40) and the “Pharisees” (Jn 8:12–20). According to Leg. All. 3.205 the controversy is 
between Philo himself and probably some other group of interpreters.31 
                                                          
27
 R. Schnackenburg, The Gospel according to St John (Translated by C. Hastings, F. McDonagh, D. Smith, and 
R. Foley from the German Das Johannesevangelium [vol. 2. HThK; Freiburg: Herder, 1971]; London: Burns & 
Oates, 1980) 38. Borgen (Early Christianity, 210-211) follows Scnackenburg in this interpretation of Jn 5:37 and 
Jn 6:27b.. 
28
 Cf. Dahl, “The Johannine Church”, 109; Borgen, Bread from Heaven (NovT Suppl. 10; Leiden: Brill, 1965. 
Reprint 1981) 151; Pancaro, The Law, 218-226.  
29
 Dahl (“The Johannine Church,” 109) refers to Sir 17:6 and Midrash Mekilta on Exod 19:11. 
30
 Cf. Borgen, Philo, John and Paul: New Perspectives on Judaism and Early Christianity (Brown Judaic 
Studies 131; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1987) 165. 
31
 To the issue of various groups of interpreters in Alexandria, cf. , e.g., D. Hay, “Philo’s References to Other 
Allegorists,” Studia Philonica 6 (1979-1980) 41-75; idem, Both Literal and Allegorical. Studies in Philo of 
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2. Use of the form of “questions and answers” in the context of learned settings 
 
The Johannine discourses are genetically quite diverse, with parallels to a wide range of 
literary patterns and generic “forms”.32 Dialogic discourses, with either friendly or hostile 
interlocutors, are common in John. According to R. Bauckham, the polemic dialogues and 
discourses in John, punctuated by questions and objections, are probably historically credible 
as representations of the way Jesus taught.33 Observations on Jn 8:12–20 in the light of 
Philonic evidence may support such a consideration.  Thus, we will observe that the discourse 
of John 8:12–20 meets the historiographical criterion of appropriateness to speaker and 
situation. 
 
First, the controversy reflected in John (Jn 8:12–20) and Philo (Leg.All. 205–208) follows the 
structure of a dialogue, including the form of “questions and answers”.34 The dialogue in Jn 
8:12–20 is introduced by the pronouncement of Jesus about himself (8:12), followed by the 
objection of the Pharisees (8:13), which in turn leads to Jesus’ refutation of the objection in 
the form of a threefold reply (8:14–18). This answer raises another question from the 
Pharisees followed by Jesus’ final answer.  
 
Philo may use complex forms of dialogues, including the devices of objections and replies. In 
Philo’s writings such objections are introduced by simple formulas, for example phrases such 
as “some said” (e[fa sa n  dev t in e") and “they say” (fa siv) as to be found in Leg.All. 3.204–205. 
Such phrases are also used when Philo makes explicit that he records the views of others.35 
Philo’s answer to the objection made by the interlocutors is in Leg.All. 3.205 introduced as a 
question: “What then must we say (t iv o u \n  lek t evo n)?” Likewise, the subsequent answers are 
quite organized: “First (p r w't o n) that there is nothing amiss in God bearing witness to Himself 
… Secondly, (e[p eit a) He Himself is to Himself all that is most precious ….” Examples of 
similar forms used in questions and answers are found in Leg.All. 1.34–35; 1.60-61; 1.102–
103; Virt. 171–174.36 
 
Second, the passage in Jn 8:12-20 is delimited by an editorial note in v. 20 commenting on the 
setting of the dialogue: “These words he spoke in the treasury, as he taught (dida vsk wn) in the 
temple ….”  According to John, Jesus’ public teaching in the form of a dialogue with his 
interlocutors often took place in the Synagogue or the Temple (cf. 6:59; 7:14,28; 18:20). 
Philo’s writings in general make evident that John’s use of such a form is appropriate when 
reporting from a learned setting within Judaism such as the Synagogue or the Temple.37 Thus, 
Philo testifies to the use of questions and answers and problem-solving exegesis as part of the 
teaching activity in the Synagogue, as suggested by his report on the expository activity 
among the Therapeutae: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Alexandria’s Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus (Brown Judaic Studies 232; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars 
Press, 1991) 81-97. 
32
 See, e.g., J. Beutler, “Literarische Gattungen im Johannesevangelium: Ein Forschungsbericht 1919-1980,” 
ANRW 2.25.3 (1985) 2506-2568; H. W. Attridge, “Genre Bending in the Fourth Gospel,” JBL 121 (2002) 3-21. 
33
 R. Bauckham, “Histriographical Characteristics of the Gospel of John,” NTS  53 (2007) 17–36. 
34
 Cf. Borgen, “The Gospel of John and Philo of Alexandria”, in Light in a Spotless Mirror: Reflections on 
Wisdom Traditions in Judaism and Early Christianity (ed. by J. H. Charlesworth and M. A. Daise; 
Harrisburg/London/New York: Trinity Press International. A Continuum imprint, 2003) 45-76.  
35
 Cf. QG 1,8; 2,64; 3,13; Opif. 77.  
36
 Cf. Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (NovT Sup 86; Leiden: Brill, 1997) 129; 131; 135. 
37
 Cf. Spec.Leg. 1.214; Leg. All. 1.33; 1.48; 1.91; 2.103; QG 1.62.    
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… the President of the company … discusses (z ht ei') some questions arising in the 
Holy Scriptures or solves (ejp ilu vet a i) one that has been propounded by someone else, 
(Contempl. 75). 
 
The verb z ht evw and the composite verb ejp iz ht evw are used also elsewhere in Philo’s writings 
when an exegetical question is raised, and answers and solutions are given.38 Moreover, in 
Contempl. 79 the leader is said to have conversed with (dia levg o m a i [“hold converse with”, 
“discuss”]) his audience, and since questions and answers were part of the discourse, the verb 
means most probably in this context “discuss”.  
 
However, a comparison of John with Philo shows obvious differences as well.  Firstly, 
different from Philo the Johannine text is not part of an exegetical exchange, even when such 
a setting is apparent in the immediate context of John 5:1-18 and 6:28-59.39 Secondly, 
although there is no direct reference to a particular learned setting in Leg. All. 3.205-208, 
which is the case in Jn 8:12–20, there are in general many observations which support the 
hypothesis that Philo’s writings draw on the expository activity in the Synagogues.40 Here we 
just want to make the point that, against the background of the teaching activity in learned 
Jewish settings, learned authors such as e.g. John and Philo, would themselves probably draw 
on the form of “questions and answers” as a rhetorical or literary device in their discourses. 
 
 
3. The ruling about the need for more than one witness 
 
The forensic debate referred to by both John and Philo regards the validity of self–witness. 
The Pharisees objects to Jesus’ assertion about himself by claiming that it cannot be true, 
since it is a self–witness and therefore invalid according to the laws of testimony. In Jn 8:17 
there is an explicit reference to the Old Testament and halachic ruling about the need for more 
than one witness, with reference to the laws of testimony such as e.g. Deut 19:15. In a passage 
of the Mishnah dealing with marriage cases, it is stated: “None may be believed when he 
testifies of himself”, (Ketuboth 2:9).41 In Jn 5:31 we need to presuppose such a forensic 
referential background regarding the invalidity of a self–witness. Accordingly, in Jn 5:31 
Jesus himself conceded to the need of more than one witness to be a valid testimony, and 
concequently he appealed to the Father’s testimony on his behalf as a second witness. Thus, it 
seems to be in the sense of a valid testimony Jesus’ words – “If I witness about myself, my 
testimony is not valid (a j lhqhv"= ‘valid’)” – are to be taken. A similar view is held by Thyen: 
 
Das es in diesem Rechtsstreit nicht um die Rekonstruktion oder ,Aufdeckung‛ irgendeiner abstrakten 
,Wahrheit‛, sondern ganz konkret um die Glaubwürdigkeit des Zeugen geht, wird man das Predikat der 
Apodosis ou jk e[ st in  ajl hq hv" am besten mit „ist nicht glaubwürdig“ wiedergeben.42  
 
Also in Leg. All. 3.205 the biblical laws of testimony seem to be presupposed by the objection 
against self–witness by those referred to by Philo: “… so if it is God that swears, He bears 
witness to Himself, which is absurd, for he that bears the witness must needs be a different 
                                                          
38
 See, Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, 100-101. 
39
 Cf. Idem, Early Christianity, 110-113; 211-223. 
40
 Cf. V. Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon de’Alexandrie: son caractère et sa portée; 
observations philologiques (ALGHJ 11; Leiden: Brill, 1977) 179-180. 
41
  The reference is taken from The Mishnah. Translated from the Hebrew with Introduction and brief 
Explanatory Notes (Translated  by H. Danby. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1933) 247. 
42
 Thyen, Das Johannesevangelium, 319. 
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person from him on whose behalf it is borne.”43 Moreover, Philo’s reply to this objection in 
Leg. All. 3.205–208 that God is the only one who can witness in his own case, because God 
alone is to himself the only valid witness, indicates that, as in John, the issue which is 
discussed is the ‘Glaubwürdigkeit’ and validity of a witness.44   
 
 
4. The concept of self–witness applied to God. 
 
In both Philo and John the concept of self-witness is applied to God. So, Borgen’s suggestion 
seems to be to the point when he claims that “John presupposes Jewish debate on the 
forenscic rule against self-witness and the problem that arises when it is applied to God.”45  
 
According to Leg. All. 3.205 the objection against self–witness, even when applied to God, is 
stated by Philo’s interlocutors referred to as “they”:  
 
They say indeed that an oath is a calling God to witness to a point which is dispute; so 
if it is God that swears, He bears witness to Himself, which is absurd, for he that bears 
the witness must needs be a different person from him on whose behalf it is borne.  
 
Philo’s reply to this objection is that there is an exception to the rule against self-witness, viz. 
only God is capable of giving witness to himself: “First that there is nothing amiss in God 
bearing witness to Himself. For who else would be capable of bearing witness to Him?” (Leg. 
All. 3.205). This issue is repeated several times throughout Leg. All. 3.206–208:  
 
Nay He alone (m o vn o ") shall affirm anything regarding Himself since He alone (m o vn o ") 
has unerringly exact knowledge of His own nature (206).  
 
God therefore is the strongest security first for Himself, and in the next place for His 
deeds also, so that He naturally swore by Himself when giving assurance as to 
Himself, a thing impossible for another than He (207).  
 
[…] but let God be His own most sure guarantee and evidence (208).  
 
Such statements make the point that God’s witness is self–authenticating, because no one but 
God alone (m o vn o ") can be able to testify to God. It is also interesting to note that according to 
Philo the main reason for this is that God has not revealed his true nature to the human race:  
 
 
Nothing that can give assurance can give positive assurance touching God, for to none 
has He shown His nature, but He has rendered it invisible to our whole race. Who can 
assert of the First cause either that It is without body or that It is a body, that It is of 
such a kind or that It is of no kind? In a word who can make any positive assertion 
concerning His essence or quality or state or movement? Nay He alone shall affirm 
                                                          
43
 Philo deals with the question of testimony in Spec. Leg. 4.55-78. In Spec. Leg. 4.53-54 he refers to various 
biblical texts prohibiting the evidence of a single witness such as Num 35:30, Deut 17:6 (on death sentences), 
and Deut 19:15 (on all offences). 
44
 Cf. the conclusion reached in Leg. All. 3.208: “ … but let God be his own evidence (pi vst i ") and most sure 
witness (mart u r iva b eba iot avt h)” [our translation]. 
45
 Borgen, “Review”, 9. 
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anything regarding Himself since He alone has unerringly exact knowledge of His 
own nature (Leg. All. 3.206). 
 
… so that He naturally swore by Himself when giving assurance as to Himself, a thing 
impossible for another than He. It follows that men who say that they swear by God 
should be considered actually impious; for naturally no one swears by Him, seeing that 
he is unable to possess knowledge regarding his nature (Leg. All. 3.207). 
 
 
It is our hypothesis that such a kind of self-authentic witness by God and its reasoning 
documented by Philo provides a referential background for the statement in Jn 5:37–38.  
According to Jn 5:37a., Jesus said: “And the Father who sent me has himself (ejk ei'n o ") borne 
witness to me.” As we pointed out above, it is not clear to what the specific witness borne by 
the Father refers. Together with Thyen, we hold the view that there is a distinction between 
the other witnesses, viz. the “works” and the “Scriptures”, explicitly mentioned in Jn 5:36 and 
Jn 5:39 and God’s own witness referred to in Jn 5:37.46 If the Father’s witness alludes to 
God’s self–authenticating testimony, corresponding to the kind we found in Philo, an 
explanation might be given both to the emphasis on the demonstrative pronoun ejk ei'n o " in Jn 
5:37a. and to the statement following in Jn 5:37b.-38: God’s voice has not been heard, nor has 
his form been seen; and they [i.e. the “Jews”] have not his word abiding in you. In our view 
the words of Jn 5:37b are a statement of a fact and of the recognized principle about God’s 
transcendence. The fact is the notion that the “Jews” have ever heard the voice of God or seen 
his form.47 The principle is that there is no direct access to the Father: God is transcendent, 
and his form and voice are not immediately accessible and assessable. Thus, the meaning of 
Jn 5:37-38 can be paraphrased as follows: Jesus said: The most adequate evidence of all is 
that the Father has himself borne witness to me. This is a self–authenticating testimony, 
because only my Father himself can testify to the divine relation between himself and me. If 
you suggest other ways in which God might have been expected to give witness, this is to be 
denied. The reason is that there is no direct sight or hearing of God, so you have never heard 
his voice and never seen his form; and because you refuse to believe in me, this shows that his 
word could not be abiding in you.48  
 
Such an understanding of Jn 5:37-38 is also supported by Jesus’ claim in Jn 5:34 that he does 
not accept witness from a human being. The meaning of this statement in the context is that a 
human witness such as the Baptist’s would not have been adequate from Jesus’ point of view. 
For the matter requiring evidence is the relation of Jesus to the Father, and this cannot rest on 
human surmise, but only on God. In the last analysis only God can testify to divine relations. 
Moreover, Jn 8:14 seems to follow the same argumentative pattern as Jn 5:37–38. In Jn 8:14 
the validity of the self–authenticating testimony of Jesus in terms of knowing about his divine 
origin is marked out in contrast to unknowing of the Pharisees: “… but you do not know 
                                                          
46
 Cf. Thyen,  Das Johannesevangelium, 323. Cf. also R. Hakola, Identity Matters: John, the Jews and 
Jewishness (NovT Sup 118; Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005) 150. 
47
 B. Lindars (The Gospel of John [London: Oliphants, 1972] 229), commenting on Jn 5,37b., is probably right 
when he claims that the Jewish rabbis would certainly agree with Jesus about the issue of divine transcendence. 
The evidence in Philo, Leg. All. 3.205–208, substantiates such a point of view. 
48
 It is plausible that Jn 5:37-38 implies a polemic directed against Jewish claims to participate in the Sinai 
theophany as visionaries. Elsewhere in John, we meet the denial that anyone has ever seen God (Jn 1:18; 6:46), 
which seems to be a polemic against the idea of Moses’ ascent to heaven when he ascended the mountain and 
against similar claims of, or for, other human beings (Philo, De Vit. Mos. 1.158-159; cf. also Josephus, Ant. 3.96; 
Bib. Ant. 12.1; 4Q491 (frag. 11) 1:12-19; Mek. Exod. 19:20; Num. Rab.  12:11; Midr. Ps. 24:4 and 106:2). 
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whence I come and whither I am going”.49 Whereas Jn 5:37–38 suggest that the  self–
authenticating witness of God could not be validated by other means, Jn 8:14 correspondingly 
points out that Jesus is so one with God that his testimony is self-authenticating. Again, the 
implicit presupposition in both texts is that God by definition needs no one to validate God’s 
self-testimony. In addition, in Jn 8:18 the line of thought is that Jesus’ witness to himself and 
his Father’s testimony amount to the same thing because of the unity between the Son and the 
Father. So we make the observation that Jesus in speaking of himself uses the expression 
ejg wv eijm iv―“I am the one who bears witness about myself”―to stress his identification with 
the role of God as self-authenticating witness. Thus, the theme of God’s self-authenticating 
witness in John becomes Christological: God testifies to himself in the words and works of 
Jesus. 
 
  
5. The epistemological argument for Jesus’ testimony as self-authenticating 
 
In Jn 8:14 Jesus enters the role of God as an exception from the rule that no one can witness 
in his own case:  
 
Even if I do bear witness about myself, my testimony is true, for I know whence I 
come and whither I am going, but you do not know whence I come and whither I am 
going.  
 
The reason is here stated as an epistemological argument in terms of knowing where he has 
come from and where he is going. W. Meeks emphasises the issue of Jesus’ descent and 
ascent as the content of his esoteric knowledge and as the key to understanding Jesus’ identity 
throughout John’s Gospel:  
 
The pattern in John of descent and ascent becomes the cipher for Jesus’ self-
knowledge as well as for his foreignness to the men of this world. His testimony is 
true because he alone knows “where I come from and where I am going” (8:14). The 
evangelist has laid the groundwork for this statement. In 3:8 he introduced the motif, 
with the statement to Nicodemus that of both the Spirit and of the one born of the 
spirit (= “from above”) “you do not know where he comes from and where he goes.” 
The Jerusalemites at the feast of the Tabernacles think they know where Jesus is from:  
his Galilean origin precludes his being the Prophet or the Christ (7:37-52).  
[…] the dialogue itself tells the reader that the Jews do not really know where Jesus is 
from (7:28-9: he is from God), but in a later dialogue he has them admit that they do 
not know where he is from (9:29: “We know that God spoke to Moses, but this man-
we do not know where he is from”). Pilate also asks Jesus, “Where are you from?” 
(19:9) and receives no answer. The descent and ascent of the Son of Man thus 
                                                          
49
 Cf. Thyen, Das Johannesevangelium, 424, who reads Jn 8:14 in light of Jn 5:34:  
 
Die ‚Wahrheit‛ auch seines Zeugnisses für sich selbst begründet Jesus also mit seinem Wissen um sein 
Woher und sein Wohin. Wie er als der einzige Sohn, „den Gott nicht dazu gesandt hat, dass er die Welt 
verurteile, sondern dazu, dass die Welt durch ihn gerettet werde“ (3,17), um seinen Auftrag weiss und – 
wie er 5,34 bereits erklärt hatte – keines Menschen als seines Zeugen bedarf 
(ejg w; de; ou j p ara; ajn qrwv pou  t h;n  mart u r ivan  l a mbav n w), ist es unvermeidlich, dass er für sich selbst 
zeugen muss. 
 
Unfortunately, Thyen has not applied a similar way of reasoning in his interpretation of Jn 5:37–38 as compared 
to the way he reads Jn 8:14. 
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becomes not only the key to his identity and identification, but also the primary 
content of his esoteric knowledge which distinguishes him from men who belong to 
“this world.”50 
 
There is an important parallel to this epistemological argument in Philo. In a corresponding 
way to Jn 8:14, Philo refers in Leg. All. 3.205–206 to the esoteric knowledge of God 
regarding his essence, quality, state, and movement as reason for the case that God can testify 
to himself: 
 
Secondly, He Himself is to Himself all that is most precious, kinsman, intimate, friend, 
virtue, happiness, blessedness, knowledge, understanding, beginning, end, whole, 
everything, judge, decision, counsel, law, process, sovereignty […] 
In a word who can make any positive assertion concerning His essence or quality or 
state or movement? […] (205). 
 
Nay He alone shall affirm anything regarding Himself since He alone has unerringly 
exact knowledge of His own nature (206). 
 
A presupposition of this way of arguing about God seems to be the wide currency of the 
principle “like is known by like” (t o i'" o Jm o ivo i" t a; o {m o ia  g in wvsk esqa i) in Antiquity.51 Philo’s 
emphasis that God’s existence cannot be apprehended by any human co-operation is probably 
due to this principle of likeness.52 
 
 
6. Contrast between the divine and human testimony 
 
There seems to be a contrast between the validity of a divine and human testimony in John. R. 
Bultmann made this point in his comment on Jn 5:34; Jesus cannot accept the witness of men, 
as that would mean “that there is a commensurable relationship between human and divine 
standards ….”53 In both Jn 5:31 and 8:14 Jesus presupposes that if he as a merely human had 
witnessed in his own case, his testimony would be invalid. However, because of another 
divine testimony, and because of his divine union with the Father, Jesus claims that he can 
witness in his own case (Jn 8:14). This contrast between a human and divine level is also 
presupposed by John in the following statements on Jesus’ testimony: 
 
Not that the testimony which I receive is from man …, (Jn 5:34). 
 
But the testimony which I have is greater than that of John; for the works which the 
Father has granted me to accomplish … bear me witness that the Father has sent me, 
(Jn 5:36). 
 
 
                                                          
50
 W. Meeks, “The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism,” JBL 91 (1972) 44-72, 60. 
51
 The principle is recorded according to the work Against the Professors 1.303 by Sextus Empiricus (2.-3. 
century A.D.). 
52
 Cf. K. O. Sandnes , “Whence and Whither: A Narrative Perspective on Birth a[n w qen (John 3,3-8),” Biblica 86 
(2005) 153-173, esp. 158-162, who compares Philo and John on this point. 
53
 R. Bultmann, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (Translated by G. R. Beasley-Murray from German Das 
Evangelium des Johannes [KEK 2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1941]; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971) 
264. 
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The Baptist’s witness obviously served a different purpose as compared to the others. It was 
not evidence in the legal sense which was required, but a pointer on a human level to Jesus as 
the agent of salvation, so that men might turn to Jesus and be saved (Jn 5:33-36). 
 
It is interesting that Philo provides a parallel to this distinction between a divine and human 
testimony. In Leg. All. 3.208 Philo distinguishes between God as the strongest security for 
himself and his deeds and the human being who is unable to possess knowledge about God’s 
nature, and thus cannot testify to God. On this basis Philo draws the conclusion: 
 
… for it is enough for the created being that he should be accredited and have witness 
borne to him by the divine word: but let God be His own most sure evidence and 
witness, (Leg. All. 3.208). 
  
 
7. The “works” as an aspect of God’s testimony 
 
In Jn 5:36 it is said that Jesus’ “works” bear witness to him that “the Father has sent me”. In 
the Johannine context “signs” such as the healing of the paralytic (Jn 5:1–9) and the feeding 
of the 5000 (Jn 6:1–21) exemplify the witnessing function of Jesus’ “works”: They prove 
Jesus’ relation to the Father, because they are done with God’s authority with the aim of 
fulfilling his redemptive purpose. In John there is an emphasis on Jesus’ functional union with 
his Father with the purpose of avoiding that Jesus could be accused of ditheism.54 In Jn 5:36 
John solves this problem by emphasizing that Jesus was entirely dependent on God.55 Thus, it 
is presupposed that God is actually testifying to himself in the works which Jesus performs.56  
 
In Leg. All. 3.207 it is correspondingly stated that God’s works are an aspect of the way God 
gives assurance as to himself: ‘God alone therefore is the strongest security first for Himself, 
and in the next place for His deeds also .…’57  
 
 
8. The human being is accredited and has witness borne to him by the interpreting word 
of God 
 
In Jn 5:39 the witness of the Scriptures is mentioned: “You search the Scriptures 
(ejr eu n a 't e t a ;" g r a fav"), because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they 
that bear witness to me.” In the literary context of Jn, chapters 5–6, Jn 5:39 functions as a 
hermeneutical principle with a parallel formulated in Jn 5:46: “If you believed Moses, you 
would believe me, for he wrote of me.” The phrase ejr eu n a 't e (t a ;" g r a fav") in Jn 5:39 is a 
Greek equivalent for the technical term for performing midrashic exegesis (`rd). It is 
                                                          
54
 On the problem of Johannine Christology and monotheism, see, e.g., L. Hartman, “Johannine Jesus-Belief and 
Monotheism,” in Aspects on the Johannine Literature: Papers presented at a conference of Scandinavian New 
Testament exegetes at Uppsala, June 16-19, 1986 (Edited by L. Hartman and B. Olsson. CBNT 18; Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987) 85-99. 
55
 Correspondingly, when Philo in Deter. 160–161 solves the problem of ditheism with regard to Moses, he 
makes clear that God is himself active, while Moses was passive when he appeared as god. This is seen from 
Philo’s statement of the biblical expression that God gave him as “god to Pharaoh” (Exod 7:1). Cf.  Borgen, 
“The Gospel of John and Philo of Alexandria”, 68.   
56
 Cf. also Jn 10:37–38. According to Jn 8:29 Jesus did nothing by himself, but only what he had been taught by 
his Father. Cf. Schnackenburg, The Gospel (vol. 2), 121. 
57
 In Vit. Mos. 2.263 Philo characterizes the “sign” (shm ei'on) of manna falling from heaven as a testimony 
(mart u riva). Cf. also Josephus, Ap. 2.53. 
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interesting that the Scripture quoted in Jn 6:31 and its midrashic exposition in the subsequent 
vv. 31–58 can be seen to serve as an illustration of the searching of the Scriptures and their 
witness to Jesus mentioned in Jn 5:39.58 Thus, e.g., on the basis of the hermeneutical key 
formulated in Jn 5:39, the pronouncement in Jn 6:35a., “I am the bread of life”, renders the 
precise meaning of the central term in the Scriptural quotation in 31b. “bread from heaven he 
gave them to eat”. The Old Testament quotation in Jn 31b. and its exposition in Jn 6:35a. bear 
witness to Jesus. 
 
In light of its immediate context, Jn 5:39 expresses the hope that the “Jews” might be able to 
have witness borne to them of the life available through Jesus, for they approach the 
Scriptures through learned exposition in the hope that in them they may have eternal life, and 
the Scriptures testify to Jesus. According to John, the learned study of the “Jews” and the 
testimony of the Scriptures seem to be in vain since they refuse to believe in Jesus. 
 
Again, Leg. All. 3.208 provides an analogy to the conception of the “Scriptures” accredited 
humans as witness. Using the exegetical method of confirming one reading of the biblical text 
against an alternative one59, Philo makes a distinction between God’s own testimony and the 
witness of the divine word, which in the context of Leg.All. 3.207 is characterized as “the 
interpreting word” (t o u ' ejr m hn evw" lo vg o u), accredited to human beings:  
 
Moses too, let us observe, filled with wonder at the transcendency of the Uncreate, 
says, “and thou shalt swear by His name” [Deut. vi. 13], not “by Him,” for it is enough 
for the created being that he should be accredited and have witness borne to him by the 
Divine word; but let God be His own most sure guarantee and evidence. 
 
Moreover, in Leg. All. 3.162 we have a close parallel to Jn 5:39. There we find the transitional 
formulation with the verb m a r tu r evw as the key word: “That the food of the soul is not earthly 
but heavenly, we shall find abundant evidence in the Sacred Word 
(m a r t ur hvsei dia ; p leio vn wn  o J iJer o ;" lo vg o ").” Thus, we find here a correspondence to the idea 
in Jn 5:39 that the “Scriptures” bear witness to Jesus, who, according to Jn 6:31–58, is “the 
bread of life” which came down from heaven.60  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The following points can summarize the observations of this study: 
 
1. The parallel material in Philo, Leg. All. 3.205-208 provides documentation for the view that 
the controversy on self-witness reflected in Jn 5:31-40 and 8:12-20 is a specifically 
‘Christian’ version of a discussion which most probably also has existed among Jews in 
Alexandria.  
 
2. The controversy reflected in John (Jn 8:12–20) and Philo (Leg.All. 205–208) follows the 
structure of a dialogue, including the form of “questions and answers”. 
                                                          
58
 Cf. Borgen, Early Christianity, 217. 
59
 Cf. Idem, Philo of Alexandria, 155. Philo’s use of this method (cf. e.g., Migr.1; 43) has parallels in examples 
found in rabbinic exegesis such as Mek. on Exod 15:11, and also in the New Testament, Gal 3:16. 
60
 Cf. Idem, “The Scriptures and the Words and Works of Jesus: Glimpses from my Research in the Gospel of 
John”, forthcoming. 
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3. In particular the view represented by Philo, viz. that only God was capable of giving a self–
authenticating testimony, may illuminate the Jewish background of the point made by the 
Evangelist that Jesus could testify in his own case because of his divine origin. 
 
4. It is our hypothesis that the kind of a self-authentic witness by God and its reasoning 
documented by Philo provides a further referential background for the statement in Jn 5:37–
38. Thus, the words of Jn 5:37b. state the reason for God’s self-witness by the principle of 
God’s transcendency, viz. the “form” and voice of God are not immediately accessible. 
Hence, other ways in which one might have expected God to witness are ruled out. 
 
5. According to Jn 8:14 Jesus enters the role of God as an exception from the rule that no one 
can witness in his own case. The reason is then stated as an epistemological argument in terms 
of knowing where Jesus has come from and where he is going. In a corresponding way to Jn 
8:14, Philo refers in Leg. All. 3.205–206 to the esoteric knowledge of God regarding his 
essence, quality, state, and movement as the reason for the case that God can testify to 
himself. 
 
6. In John it is presupposed that God is actually testifying to himself by the “works” which 
Jesus performs. In Philo, Leg. All. 3.207 it is correspondingly stated that God’s “deeds” are an 
aspect of the way God gives assurance as to himself: “God alone therefore is the strongest 
security first for Himself, and in the next place for His deeds also .…” 
 
7. Likewise, in Leg. All. 3.208 the distinction is made between God’s own testimony and the 
witness of the divine word accredited to human beings. Thus, we find here an analogy to the 
idea in Jn 5:39 that the “Scriptures” bear witness to the “Jews” about Jesus, who is the source 
of the life for which the “Jews” are searching. According to John, the learned study of the 
“Jews” and the testimony of the “Scriptures” seem to be in vain since they refuse to believe in 
Jesus. Such observations support the conclusion that both Philo and John distinguish between 
testimonies on the divine level and testimonies accredited on a human level. According to 
John both levels of testimonies are said to attest to the “identity” of Jesus. 
 
8. In the presentation of seminar group 4 “The Role of Biblical Traditions in Identity 
Formation”, it is stated that one of the objects is to investigate how certain biblical texts and 
traditions influence on Christology. Since the “Nordic New Testament Conference 2007” pay 
special attention to perspectives related to forces forming the identity of early Christians, an 
aspect of our study has been to focus on how a controversy on the biblical laws of testimony 
within Early Judaism might have contributed to the formation of a “high Christology” as part 
of the controversy between Early Judaism and the emerging Christian Community at the end 
of the first century A.D. Thus, in the form of a dialogue in arguments with other “Jews”, the 
Johannine controversies clarify the sense in which Jesus was for such a circle of believers 
“equal to God”.   
 
 
 
 
 
